Friday, May 4, 2012

Simulation Argument

The Rationally Speaking podcast is always interesting but the most recent edition was even more thought provoking than usual. This special edition was recorded with David Kyle Johnson at the Northeast Conference on Science and Skepticism. As a thought experiment the Simulation Argument is fascinating and leads to a variety of equally interesting variations and tangents.

There were a few minor points that I either was uncertain of or felt were misconstrued. I'm not sure where the 20% figure came from. I've read a few of Nick Bostrom's articles and papers and do not recall his attaching an actual number. I remember his use of equations to demonstrate specific points and to convey the logic and probability but no definitive numbers. Bostrom does actually state in a few places that he finds it highly unlikely that we are in a simulation.

I also do not think Johnson thought through his comment about not needing a body for the simulation to work. I assume he meant a human body is not necessary for the idea of our existence being contained within a computer simulation. In practical terms, the computer running the simulation would be a "body." It is an important detail since without it it would imply that immaterial existence is possible. This would, of course, defy all that is known or can be known. Physics does not allow for such an immaterial sentient existence.

The basic ideas surrounding the simulation scenario are more than interesting enough to listen to the podcast a handful of times. Johnson's application of the experiment to theology was also notable. It definitely poses some fascinating potential solutions to various theological problems as well as a few dilemmas.

For more on Bostrom's works on the Simulation Argument

Original proposition
http://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.pdf

Clarification/revision
http://www.simulation-argument.com/brueckner.pdf

Philosophy Bites (podcast) interview
http://philosophybites.com/2011/08/nick-bostrom-on-the-simulation-argument.html

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